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SUMMARy
There is growing consensus among 
policymakers and stakeholders that an effective 
federal program to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions should include polices that 
hasten the development and commercialization 
of low- and no-carbon energy technologies, 
as well as technologies that increase end-use 
energy efficiency. Alongside policies such as a 
GHG cap-and-trade system that would directly 
mandate emissions reductions, policies that 
would instead target innovation and investment 
in GHG-reducing technologies have been much 
discussed. While both types of policies may be 
motivated by concerns about climate change, 
technology policies are generally framed in 
terms of technology-development activities or 
technology-specific mandates and incentives 
rather than primarily in terms of emissions. 
A wide range of options for promoting 
climate-friendly technologies is currently being 
employed or proposed at the federal and 
state levels. It is useful to roughly categorize 
these options according to which stage of the 
technology-innovation process they target: 
research, development, and demonstration 
(RD&D) or commercial deployment. After 
exploring various rationales for technology 
policy, this issue brief examines the funding 
sources, institutions, and policy instruments that 
have a potential role to play in enhancing RD&D 
efforts to advance climate change mitigation 
and adaptation technologies. A companion 
issue brief addresses options for promoting 
technology deployment, including mandates, 
financial incentives, and enabling regulations.
A number of important messages emerge:
An emissions price established through a •	
GHG cap-and-trade or tax system would 
induce firms to invest and innovate in 
developing technologies that reduce 
emissions more effectively and at lower cost.  
Nonetheless, several motivations exist •	
for including additional RD&D policies 
as complements to a pricing policy in a 
comprehensive strategy to address climate 
change. R&D tends to be underprovided 
in a competitive market because its 
benefits are often widely distributed and 
difficult to capture by individual firms. 
Given the likelihood that the magnitude 
of GHG reductions needed to address 
climate concerns will increase significantly 
over time, private-sector investment in 
technology innovation is likely to fall 
short of what may be desirable over the 
long term, particularly given the fragility 
of expectations concerning future GHG 
prices and the uncertain credibility of 
near-term policy commitments. Ensuring 
that capable, university-trained researchers 
will be available to the public and private 
sectors in the future provides another 
compelling motivation for public spending 
on technology R&D, especially given 
the importance of investing in human 
capital to maintain long-term economic 
competitiveness.
While public funding for research tends •	
to be widely supported, there is less 
agreement about the justification for public-
policy intervention (beyond the emissions 
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price) as one moves from basic R&D to the demonstration 
and deployment phases of technological innovation. 
Although particular energy RD&D programs have produced •	
some notable failures and although their performance has 
varied widely, studies have found that federal energy R&D 
investments have on the whole yielded substantial direct 
economic benefits as well as external benefits such as 
pollution mitigation and knowledge creation. Government-
sponsored energy R&D programs are also commonly 
thought to have improved substantially since the 1970s  
and early 1980s—both in terms of the way they are 
managed and in terms of the objectives they target— 
as their emphasis shifted from energy independence 
and large-scale demonstration projects to environmental 
improvement, precommercial research, public-private 
partnerships, and cost-sharing. Private industry 
involvement is almost always mentioned as being very 
important, particularly as new technologies approach the 
commercialization stage. 
Substantially boosting efforts to develop and deploy •	
low-GHG energy alternatives would require a sustained 
increase in RD&D funding and increased market demand 
for associated technologies (where increased demand 
would likely be due, at least in part, to the concurrent 
implementation of policies that provide an economic 
incentive for reducing GHG emissions). Increased funding 
could come from general revenues through the standard 
appropriations process, from revenues generated by 
emission taxes or the sale of emission allowances, or from 
wires and pipes charges on electricity and other fuels. 
Alternatively or in addition, increased investment could be 
induced through more generous R&D tax credits. Because 
associated revenues may be less likely to be diverted for 
other budget purposes, allowance sales or wires and pipes 
charges, or both, are likely to provide the largest and  
most stable dedicated funding stream.  
Numerous existing institutions are engaged in energy •	
RD&D, including the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), 
DOE’s national laboratories, the National Science 
Foundation (NSF), universities, individual firms, private 
research consortia, and non-profit research institutions. 
These institutions vary both in terms of their roles in 
funding versus performing research and in terms of which 
stage(s) of the innovation process they  primarily engage 
(i.e., basic research, applied research, development, 
and demonstration). The existing system of institutions 
involved in energy innovation is best characterized as 
an interconnected network of entities with different and 
somewhat overlapping roles—it does not have a highly 
unified or linear structure. 
A number of objectives are frequently noted in relation to •	
public investments in RD&D.  These include effective and 
efficient management and performance, stable funding, 
insulation from politics, and public accountability. Some of 
these aspirations are mutually reinforcing, while others may 
conflict. 
Regarding the •	 administration and coordination of federal 
energy RD&D, greater concern is typically expressed about 
existing institutional capacity to manage an expanded 
funding base for applied RD&D than about the ability of 
existing government institutions (such as the DOE Office of 
Science, the NSF, and the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology) to effectively administer increased funds for 
basic research. The existing suite of institutions that actually 
perform RD&D—including universities and other non-profit 
institutions, the national laboratories, and private firms—
seems sufficiently broad to handle an increase in funding, 
although capacity would need to deepen if considerable 
expansion of current research efforts was desired. 
The main institutional options for administering an •	
expanded public investment in applied energy RD&D are 
the existing DOE program offices (i.e., Energy Efficiency 
and Renewable Energy, Fossil, and Nuclear), a new 
government agency or agencies (for example, recent 
proposals have called for an energy version of the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency or “ARPA-E” and a 
Climate Technology Financing Board), a new quasi-public 
corporation (recent proposals refer to a new Energy 
Technology Corporation or Climate Change Credit 
Corporation), and/or private research consortia. These 
options differ in terms of how likely they are to meet the 
range of policy objectives mentioned above (e.g., efficiency 
and accountability)—in perception and in practice.  
The primary mechanisms that have historically been used •	
to deliver public support for RD&D—including contracts, 
grants, and tax credits—will continue to play a central role, 
perhaps with some incremental modifications. Technology 
innovation prizes represent a new opportunity for 
expanding the range of instruments used to provide RD&D 
incentives; both the private and public sectors are currently 
experimenting with this approach.
119
120
CLIMATE TECHNOLOGy RESEARCH,  DEVELOPMENT,  AND DEMONSTRATION: 
FUNDING SOURCES ,  INST ITUT IONS,  AND INSTRUMENTS
The Role of RD&D Policy
R&D encompasses activities associated with discovering new 
knowledge and applying that knowledge to create new and 
improved products, processes, and services—in this case 
with the aim of reducing GHG emissions.1 Demonstration 
projects, on the other hand, test the feasibility of GHG-
reducing technology at a scale that is closer to what would be 
employed in wider commercial deployment. 
When considered alongside policies that impose mandatory 
GHG-reduction requirements, additional technology policies 
may not seem necessary or desirable. After all, the point of 
market-based approaches is to establish a price on GHG 
emissions. This price in turn attaches a financial value to 
GHG reductions and—just as people will consume less of 
something that carries a price than they will of something 
that is given away for free—should induce households and 
firms to buy technologies with lower GHG emissions (a more 
efficient appliance, for example) the next time they are in the 
market. This market-demand pull should in turn encourage 
manufacturers to invest in R&D efforts to bring new lower-
GHG technologies to market, just as they do for other 
products and processes.
There are nonetheless several rationales or motivations for 
considering technology-oriented policies within a portfolio 
of climate policies that also includes pricing emissions. The 
economics literature on R&D points to the difficulty firms 
face in capturing all the benefits from their investments in 
innovation, which tend to spill over to other technology 
producers and users. This market reality can lead to under-
investment in innovative efforts—even given intellectual 
property protection—potentially warranting policies that 
directly target R&D. In a related manner, the fact that 
knowledge can be relatively inexpensive to share once it  
is produced raises the possibility that coordinated public  
R&D programs can conserve resources by reducing 
duplicative efforts.
The problem of private-sector under investment in technology 
innovation may be exacerbated in the climate context where 
the energy assets involved are often very long-lived and 
where the incentives for bringing forward new technology rest 
1 the national science Foundation (nsF) defines research as “systematic study directed toward fuller 
knowledge or understanding,” with basic research being directed toward the “fundamental aspects of 
phenomena and of observable facts without specific applications toward processes or products in mind.” 
Applied research, by contrast, is directed toward determining “the means by which a recognized and 
specific need may be met.” development is defined by nsF as “systematic application of knowledge 
or understanding, directed toward the production of useful materials, devices, and systems or methods, 
including design, development, and improvement of prototypes and new processes to meet specific 
requirements.” see nsF. 2007. Federal Research and Development Funding by Budget Function: Fiscal 
Years 2005-07. washington, dc: nsF.
heavily on domestic and international policies rather than on 
natural market forces. Put another way, the development of 
climate-friendly technologies has little market value absent 
a sustained, credible government commitment to reducing 
GHG emissions.  Moreover, the mismatch between near-term 
technology investment and long-term needs is likely to be 
even greater in a situation where the magnitude of desired 
GHG reductions can be expected to increase over time. 
If more stringent emissions constraints will eventually be 
needed, society will benefit from near-term R&D to lower the 
cost of achieving those reductions in the future. An emissions 
price that is relatively low in the near term may be inadequate 
to induce such innovative efforts absent very credible 
expectations that the policy will indeed be tightened in the 
future. If the politically feasible near-term emissions price 
(and/or the expected long-term emissions price) is lower than 
the socially optimal level, market inducements for R&D on 
GHG-reducing technologies will also be insufficient.
Similarly, rationales for public support of technology 
demonstration projects tend to point to the large expense; 
high degree of technical, market and regulatory risk; and 
inability of private firms to capture the rewards from designing 
and constructing first-of-a-kind facilities. These motivations 
provide potentially compelling rationales for public policies 
targeted at the R&D (research, development) and D 
(demonstration) phases of the technology innovation process. 
In addition, by virtue of its critical role in the higher education 
system, public R&D funding will continue to be important in 
training researchers and engineers with the skills necessary to 
work in either the public or private sectors to produce GHG-
reducing technology innovations. By supporting graduate 
students and post-doctoral researchers, public funding for 
university-based research will affect the economy’s capacity 
to generate scientific advances, technology innovations, 
and productivity improvements in the future. This linkage 
has made research funding a priority among many who are 
concerned about the long-term competitiveness of the U.S. 
economy and has led to a recent increase in political support 
for expanded spending—particularly on physical sciences  
and engineering.  
In contrast, critics of public funding for RD&D pose the 
concern that government is ill-positioned to “pick winners” 
among a broad array of technological possibilities and 
commercial opportunities. They argue that decisions about 
how to invest in technology innovation are best left to a private 
sector motivated through broad incentives such as a price on 
GHGs. Even granting that a legitimate economic rationale 
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for public involvement exists in theory, critics assert that the 
practical import of most such programs is negligible and 
likely to be more than offset by the cost and waste associated 
with pork-barrel spending and unnecessary government 
intrusion into the market. At a minimum, these critiques point 
to the importance of designing institutions, instruments, and 
incentives for delivering publicly supported RD&D in ways that 
minimize the risk of producing undesirable outcomes.
Despite some well-know failures, however, studies typically 
find that federal energy R&D investments have, on the 
whole, yielded substantial direct economic benefits as 
well as external benefits such as pollution mitigation and 
knowledge creation (a later section of this issue brief provides 
more detail on U.S. DOE programs). Nonetheless, and 
even given increasing concerns over global climate change, 
investment in energy R&D began to increase again only 
recently following a dramatic decline in both public- and 
private-sector spending over the last three decades. In that 
time period, low fossil-fuel prices and the deregulation of the 
natural gas and electric utilities industries led to substantial 
reductions in private-sector R&D expenditures, while efforts 
to balance the federal budget and a lack of political interest 
prevented the federal government from offsetting this 
decline. U.S. DOE expenditures on energy RD&D, including 
basic energy sciences, now total slightly more than $3 billion 
annually.  This is less than half, in inflation-adjusted terms, 
of the peak level of spending reached in 1978 (see Figure 
1). Identifying potential sources of funding for an expanded 
federal investment in technology RD&D therefore represents 
an important challenge for policymakers, as discussed in the 
next section.
Overall, public funding for research tends to receive 
widespread support based on the significant positive 
spillovers typically associated with the generation of new 
knowledge. Agreement over the appropriate role of public 
policy in technology development tends to weaken, however, 
as one moves from support for research and development 
to support for demonstration projects and particularly 
deployment. For most standard market goods, economists 
and other experts generally see clear justification for a 
government role in supporting research, but much weaker 
rationales for government intervention in the realms of 
technology commercialization and widespread deployment.
RD&D Funding Options
A major concern for any RD&D program is funding.2 Decisions 
2 this section benefited greatly from nordhaus, R., et al. 2004. public sector Funding Mechanisms to 
Figure 1 U.S. DOE Energy RD&D (FY1978-FY2008)
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about the funding source(s) to be used for these programs 
have consequences for the magnitude, availability, and 
continuity of financial support in the future. They can also 
have implications for the institutional management of funds 
as well as the degree and nature of government oversight. 
This section discusses potential sources of funding for an 
expanded federal role in climate-related technology RD&D, 
including funding through general revenue, dedicated 
revenue (for example,from the sale of emission allowances), 
or wires and pipes charges. Institutional options for 
administering and performing publicly supported RD&D are 
discussed in the next section, while the use of tax credits as  
a mechanism for funding private-sector R&D efforts is 
discussed in the final section.
General Revenue 
One option for funding federal RD&D efforts is to rely on 
general revenues disbursed via Congressional appropriations 
through the U.S. Treasury. The year-to-year nature of the 
appropriations process can, however, be detrimental to 
long-term planning. Agencies can enter into multi-year 
agreements, but their financial commitments cannot exceed 
their current fiscal year appropriation. Options do exist that 
would allow for some long-range planning: for example, 
the government can use advance appropriations to commit 
specific amounts of funding for future years. Congress is 
generally averse to such pledges, however, because they 
constrain future appropriation options; moreover, promised 
funds are also easily rescinded. Another option is lump-sum 
appropriation in which all funding to be provided over the 
life of a program is made available in the year of enactment. 
This scheme provides some measure of stability, though any 
money carried over from year-to-year is still vulnerable to 
redistribution for other projects.
Dedicated Revenue, Including  
Revenue from the Sale of Emission Allowances
By establishing a dedicated revenue source, Congress could 
help to avert some of the problems associated with relying 
on general revenues. A dedicated tax on some aspect of 
energy generation, distribution, or consumption could help 
fund R&D if resulting revenues were placed in a trust fund, 
as per the Highway Trust Fund. The federal government can 
be contractually required to allow the administering agency 
to draw down the fund. Also, appropriations committees can 
be restricted from spending at a level below receipts in an 
attempt to redistribute extra funds for other purposes. This is 
not the case with all trust funds, however. The Nuclear Waste 
support the implementation of a u.s. technology strategy. Gtsp working paper 2004-07 (pnnl-14780). 
college park, Md: pacific northwest national laboratory.  
Fund, for example, is subject to annual appropriations. Since 
most climate-policy proposals introduced in Congress have 
focused on limiting GHG emissions through a cap-and-trade 
program (rather than by taxing emissions), any associated 
revenue stream that could potentially be available for RD&D 
would come from allowance sales. Several current proposals 
set aside at least a portion of revenues from auctioning 
allowances or from the direct sale of allowances at a fixed 
price under an emissions-price ceiling (that is, a safety valve) 
to support technology RD&D and deployment incentives. 
Typically, this results in a targeted funding stream on the order 
of several billion dollars annually, and up to $50 billion or 
more in total over multiple years of program implementation 
(with total amounts limited in some proposals mainly by 
funding caps). Targeting revenues from allowance sales under 
a safety-valve mechanism to technology development has 
the environmentally appealing feature that lesser near-term 
emissions reductions (due to the safety valve) help to pay for 
expanded investments in future abatement potential. In fact, 
one recent legislative proposal uses the term “Technology 
Accelerator Payment” to refer to safety valve payments. On 
the other hand, targeting expected revenue streams to any 
particular purpose in advance runs counter to a longstanding 
principle of public finance that favors separating revenue 
sources from spending.
For example, the Bingaman-Specter “Low Carbon Economy 
Act of 2007” (S. 1766, 110th) would establish an “Energy 
Technology Deployment Fund” within the Treasury.  Revenues 
from allowance sales would be deposited into this fund to 
be used for zero- and low-carbon technology deployment. 
Another example is the Lieberman-McCain “Climate 
Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007” (S. 280, 110th), which 
would establish a new entity called the Climate Change Credit 
Corporation (CCCC) to receive and disburse GHG allowances 
and resulting revenues.  Some of these revenues would be 
used to support a new technology deployment program, 
the Climate Technology Challenge Program. One potential 
distinction between these and other related proposals is 
whether allowances and/or funds from the sale of allowances 
are actually disbursed by a government agency through the 
Treasury or directly allocated to and disbursed by a quasi-
governmental non-profit corporation. 
In either case, it is important to note that new funding in 
both of these legislative proposals is actually directed to 
technology deployment, rather than research. For this reason, 
the more significant legislation for energy R&D may be the 
recently enacted America Competes Act (S. 761 and HR. 
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2272, 110th) which, among other things, authorizes a very 
substantial increase over the next several years in the budget 
for physical sciences and engineering research in DOE’s Office 
of Science, the NSF, and the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST).  In addition, this bill establishes an 
Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) within 
DOE (see further discussion later in this issue brief). The 
degree to which future appropriations will support these 
authorizations remains to be seen.  
Wires and Pipes Charges
Using dedicated fees on electricity, natural gas, or other 
forms of energy—sometimes referred to as wires and pipes 
charges—could help fund RD&D within or outside the 
normal appropriations process. By levying surcharges on the 
transmission and distribution of electricity and/or natural 
gas, or as part of federally regulated rates for transporting 
oil, coal, or other fuels, Congress could establish a stable 
source of funding for energy-technology investments. This 
is closely related to the approach of using electricity wires 
charges for “public benefit funds” that in turn support energy 
efficiency programs and related research activities (states that 
currently have such funds include New York and California). 
Another example is the Universal Service Fund, which was 
established by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and which 
uses fees on telephone services to promote wider access to 
telecommunications. 
In principal, the proceeds from a wires charge could flow 
to any number of different institutional entities, including 
a federal trust fund, state agencies, a quasi-governmental 
corporation, private research consortia, or to the collecting 
firm (such as the distribution utility in the case of a fee on 
electricity services) for approved purposes. One potential 
problem is that it could be administratively difficult to levy 
fees in cases where carbon-containing fuels are not subject to 
existing transportation rate regulation. It may also be desirable 
to harmonize the relative charge across various fuels (e.g., 
based on carbon content). These considerations may argue 
for instead relying on emissions allowances or GHG taxes (as 
described in the preceding section) as the primary funding 
source. Wires and pipes charges may nonetheless have certain 
practical advantages and could be imposed even in the 
absence of, or in advance of, mandatory GHG regulations.
A related alternative is a so-called “check-off” program 
analogous to those that fund the agricultural commodity 
boards overseen by the Department of Agriculture (such 
boards exist for beef, pork, and dairy). Congress could direct 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to impose a 
wires and pipes charge on certain types of fuels if the charge 
is passed by industry referendum. In 2002, for example, the 
American Gas Association proposed a check-off program for 
gas research. We discuss a related institutional option—“self-
organizing industry boards”—in a later section on private 
research consortia. 
RD&D Institutional Options
A range of institutional options exists for administering and 
performing energy RD&D in the public and private sectors. 
These options include government agencies (e.g., DOE, NSF, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of 
Defense), private firms and consortia, universities, and other 
non-profit research institutions. We focus here primarily on 
the institutions most often considered in policy discussions 
concerning an expanded role for public funding of energy- or 
climate-related RD&D.   
U.S. Department of Energy and the National 
Laboratories
The U.S. government has spent over $100 billion in real terms 
on energy R&D over the last three decades, mostly through 
DOE programs. This direct federal spending represented 
about a third of total national expenditures on energy R&D; 
the balance was spent by the private sector. The private-
sector share of the total has fallen, however, over the last 
decade. DOE energy research has gone through several 
transitions over the last three decades, both in terms of 
its relative focus on precommercial basic research versus 
technology demonstration and in terms of the emphasis 
placed on different technology areas (e.g., nuclear power, 
fossil fuels, energy efficiency, and renewables).  Along the way, 
the Department’s research objectives have also shifted from 
addressing concerns related primarily to energy security and 
resource depletion to a greater emphasis on environmental 
issues. 
While the energy independence goal of the Nixon 
administration’s Project Independence quickly proved 
impractical, government policy with respect to energy R&D 
stressed the development of alternative liquid fuels well into 
the 1980s. This emphasis culminated in the creation of the 
Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) in 1980 which became 
emblematic of the large, expensive demonstration projects 
undertaken during this era. The following year, the incoming 
Reagan administration dramatically changed the direction 
of national energy policy and federal research goals began 
to stress long-term, pre-competitive R&D and lower overall 
budgets. The1980s were mostly a time of retrenchment for 
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DOE’s research program, although funding levels stabilized in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Congressional appropriations 
also began to emphasize environmental goals at that time, 
with large expenditures for the Clean Coal Technology 
demonstration program. 
The shift to a greater emphasis on environmental goals, 
energy efficiency and renewable energy, public-private 
partnerships, and cost-sharing continued over the course 
of the Clinton administration in the 1990s. Federal support 
for basic energy research has received the most consistent 
funding since the late 1980s, including in recent years. 
Nonetheless, interest in large-scale, government-sponsored 
demonstration projects has continued: a recent example is 
the FutureGen Initiative, which seeks to demonstrate zero-
emissions technologies for producing hydrogen and electricity 
from coal. Interestingly, the debate around FutureGen has 
highlighted some of the conflicting viewpoints that exist 
regarding the proper orientation of federal energy RD&D. On 
the one hand, some are concerned that the project represents 
too much public involvement in a large demonstration project; 
on the other hand, FutureGen has been criticized for being 
too oriented toward longer-term research and not enough 
toward near-term commercialization. This is in part related to 
funding requirements for the project, which demand a lower 
cost-share for private-sector participants than would otherwise 
be typical because the project is classified as research.
A number of studies over the last several years have evaluated 
the performance of federal energy R&D programs.3 Although 
these programs have produced some notable failures and 
although their performance has varied widely, the literature 
typically finds that federal energy R&D investments have, 
on the whole, yielded substantial direct economic benefits 
as well as external benefits such as pollution mitigation and 
knowledge creation. Government-sponsored energy R&D 
programs are also commonly thought to have improved 
substantially since the 1970s and early 1980s, both in terms 
of the way they are managed and in terms of the objectives 
they target. On balance, available studies suggest that federal 
intervention is most appropriate for R&D activities that are 
unlikely to be adequately funded by private industry. 
Moreover, these studies tend to find that the optimal federal 
energy R&D portfolio is balanced, flexible, and incorporates 
both basic and applied research, with successes offsetting 
unanticipated failures.  Private-industry involvement is almost 
always mentioned as being very important, particularly as 
3 national Research council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was it Worth It? washington, dc: national 
academies press. also see: J. chow and R.G. newell. 2004. a Retrospective Review of energy R&d. wash-
ington, dc: Resources for the Future.
technology reaches the commercialization stage; greater 
international cooperation is also desirable. Typically, stronger 
leadership, targeted spending, rigorous oversight, and clear 
goals and benchmarks are recommended as measures that 
can facilitate project success and help to minimize wasteful 
expenditures. 
At present, the federal government sponsors RD&D on GHG-
reducing technologies primarily through the approximately $3 
billion in DOE-funded grants and contracts that are awarded 
annually to national labs, universities, and industry for energy-
related research. This research support is administered largely 
by the DOE Office of Science and the DOE program offices: 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), Fossil Energy 
(FE), and Nuclear Energy (see DOE organizational chart at 
http://www.energy.gov/organization/orgchart.htm). The NSF 
and other federal agencies also fund research relevant to 
energy and climate-mitigation technology, but these efforts 
tend to be on a smaller scale and focused more on basic 
science. Federal grants and contracts fund both research 
centers and individual projects, and are often awarded 
through a competitive process involving a request for 
proposals, proposal review, and selection.
 
Within DOE, the Office of Science focuses on basic research, 
while the program offices focus almost entirely on applied 
research and development. In the United States, the DOE 
Office of Science is the largest single supporter of basic 
research in the physical sciences, accounting for 40 percent 
of federal outlays in this area. The Office of Science makes 
extensive use of peer review and federal advisory committees 
to develop general directions for research investment, help 
identify priorities, and determine which scientific proposals 
to support. Tables 1 and 2 show how much funding DOE 
directed to specific research areas in FY2006 and how this 
funding was distributed to different entities engaged in 
energy R&D.4  Note that the acronym FFRDC in these tables 
stands for “federally funded research and development 
center.”
Of the 37 currently active FFRDCs, DOE sponsors 16—more 
than any other agency.5 Otherwise known as the national 
labs, these 16 FFRDCs perform about two-thirds of DOE-
funded energy R&D and receive about 95 percent of their 
funding from the federal government. FFRDCs administered 
by universities and other non-profit entities receive the 
majority of funding, with the remainder going to industry-run 
4 Based on $4.5 billion in R&d spending by the doe program offices and office of science (which also 
supports non-energy related research). source: national science Foundation. 2007. Federal Funds for 
Research and Development: Fiscal Years 2004–06. arlington, va: nsF.
5 see http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf06316/ for a master list of all FFRdcs.
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Office Total Intramural
FFRDCs
Industry Universities Nonprofits
Industry University Nonprofit
Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy 100% 37% 7% 9% 35% — 10% 3%
Basic Research 3% 1% 1% — 1% — — —
applied Research 41% 16% 4% 4% 12% — 4% 1%
development 50% 20% 2% 5% 18% — 5% 1%
R&d plant 5% — — — 5% — — —
Fossil Energy 100% 23% 1% 4% 5% 52% 10% 5%
Basic Research 2% — — — — — 2%
applied Research 43% 6% 1% 1% 1% 24% 8% 1%
development 55% 17% — 3% 4% 28% 4%
Nuclear Energy 100% — 24% 16% 36% 7% 13% —
applied Research 99% — 24% 16% 35% 7% 13% —
development 1% — — — 1% — — —
Office of Science 100% 2% 2% 49% 25% 4% 17% 1%
Basic Research 84% 2% 2% 39% 20% 4% 17% 1%
R&d plant 16% — — 10% 5% — — —
TOTAL 100% 9% 4% 37% 25% 9% 15% 2%
Office Total Intramural
FFRDCs
Industry Universities Nonprofits
Industry University Nonprofit
Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy 645 238 43 58 226 — 63 17
Basic Research 22 9 4 2 4 — 2 1
applied Research 264 103 26 24 76 — 27 7
development 325 127 12 30 113 — 33 9
R&d plant 35 — 1 2 32 — — —
Fossil Energy 478 110 5 21 22 250 45 24
Basic Research 9 0 9 —
applied Research 204 30 5 5 5 114 37 7
development 264 80 — 15 17 135 — 17
R&d plant 1 — — — — 1 — —
Nuclear Energy 249 3 61 39 89 17 33 7
applied Research 248 3 61 39 87 17 33 7
development 2 0 — — — — — —
Office of Science 3,183 57 62 1,560 810 130 538 26
Basic Research 2,681 57 52 1,239 645 128 535 25
R&d plant 502 — 10 321 166 2 3 1
TOTAL 4,555 409 171 1,678 1,147 396 679 75
Table 1  u.s. doe Rd&d spending (Fy 2006)
Table 2  u.s. doe Rd&d spending (Fy 2006) ($ millions)
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FFRDCs, industry, universities, and other non-profit research 
organizations. The main DOE labs focused on energy science 
and technology are the university-administered Ames, 
Argonne, Lawrence Berkeley, and Fermi labs; the industry-
administered Idaho lab; the non-profit administered National 
Renewable Energy, Oak Ridge, and Pacific Northwest National 
labs; and the DOE-administered National Energy Technology 
Laboratory. All are overseen by the DOE Office of Science, 
except for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and 
the National Energy Technology Laboratory, which are 
overseen by the Department’s EERE and FE program offices 
respectively.
U.S. National Science Foundation
The NSF’s mission is to support all fields of science and 
engineering, except medicine. With a current annual budget 
of just under $6 billion, the NSF backs about 20 percent of 
all federally funded basic research performed at American 
universities and colleges. Unlike DOE, which maintains the 
network of national labs, the NSF funds all work directly 
through the researcher’s home institution. A major focus of the 
NSF’s current strategic plan is encouraging transformational 
and multidisciplinary fundamental research. In supporting 
basic research, the NSF provides funding in nascent areas 
of R&D where private firms typically do not wish to venture. 
The NSF also integrates education and training objectives in 
its funding decisions to help build human capacity to apply 
technological advances and conduct future research. 
Although the NSF does not have a program specifically 
geared toward energy research, energy- and climate-related 
projects may be funded across several of its disciplinary 
categories. Almost 60 percent of FY2002 funding went 
to engineering, the physical sciences, and environmental 
sciences. Thus, for example, recent NSF grants have been 
awarded for research to improve storage technologies for 
solar energy, to study the use of bacteria to filter hydrogen 
gas, and to develop new engineering techniques to improve 
technologies that extract energy from ocean wave currents. 
Several of the NSF’s strategic foci are also directly relevant 
to GHG mitigation, including advanced manufacturing 
technology, biotechnology, advanced materials and 
processing, civil infrastructure systems, and environmental 
research.
Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E)
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
has provided the inspiration for a number of proposals that 
would create an analogous agency focused on innovative 
energy technology research—“ARPA-E.” A major motivation 
is the desire to provide an efficient institutional home for R&D 
that does not fit well within the existing DOE organizational 
“stovepipes.” The 2005 National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS) report Rising Above the Gathering Storm included the 
following recommendations concerning a new ARPA-E:6 
The director of ARPA-E would report to the [DOE] under 
secretary for science and would be charged with sponsoring 
specific research and development programs to meet the 
nation’s long-term energy challenges. The new agency 
would support creative “out-of-the-box” transformational 
generic energy research that industry by itself cannot or 
will not support and in which risk may be high but success 
would provide dramatic benefits for the nation. This would 
accelerate the process by which knowledge obtained 
through research is transformed to create jobs and address 
environmental, energy, and security issues. ARPA-E would be 
based on the historically successful DARPA model and would 
be designed as a lean and agile organization with a great deal 
of independence that can start and stop targeted programs 
on the basis of performance and do so in a timely manner. 
The agency would itself perform no research or transitional 
effort but would fund such work conducted by universities, 
startups, established firms, and others. Its staff would turn 
over approximately every four years. Although the agency 
would be focused on specific energy issues, it is expected 
that its work (like that of DARPA or NIH) will have important 
spinoff benefits, including aiding in the education of the 
next generation of researchers. Funding for ARPA-E would 
start at $300 million the first year and increase to $1 billion 
per year over five or six years, at which point the program’s 
effectiveness would be evaluated and any appropriate actions 
taken.
A House bill to create an ARPA-E (H.R. 364) was voted out 
of the Science Committee in June 2007 and sent to the 
full House. The House version would have established 
ARPA-E within DOE and defined its primary objective as 
follows: “to reduce the amount of energy the United States 
imports from foreign sources by 20 percent over the next 
ten years.” H.R. 364 goes on to state that ARPA-E should 
accomplish this objective by “(1) promoting revolutionary 
changes in the critical technologies that would promote 
energy independence; (2) turning cutting-edge science and 
engineering into technologies for energy and environmental 
6 augustine, n., et al. 2006. Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for 
a Brighter Economic Future. washington, dc: national academies press. also see: van atta, R. 2006. 
Energy and Climate Change Research and the DARPA Model. testimony before the House committee on 
Government Reform, 109th congress, 2nd sess. Mowery, d. 2006. Lessons from the history of federal R&D 
for an Energy ARPA. testimony to the House committee on science, 109th congress, 2nd sess.
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application; and (3) accelerating innovation in energy and 
the environment for both traditional and alternative energy 
sources and in energy efficiency mechanisms to decrease 
the Nation’s reliance on foreign energy sources.” Authorized 
funding levels were similar to the recommendations in the 
Gathering Storm report and would be deposited in an energy 
independence acceleration fund within the U.S. Treasury 
to be used for awarding competitive grants and entering 
into cooperative agreements or contracts with academic 
institutions, companies, or consortia (including the national 
labs).
In April 2007, the Senate passed S. 761 (the America 
Competes Act), which among other things stated that “The 
Secretary [of Energy] shall establish an Advanced Research 
Projects Authority-Energy to overcome the long-term and 
high-risk technological barriers in the development of energy 
technologies.”  The legislation further provides for the 
Authority to have a director and an advisory board, requires 
the NAS to conduct two reviews of its actions, and authorizes 
appropriations “as necessary.” The activities of the Authority 
are much less specifically defined than in the House ARPA-E 
bill (H.R. 364). 
The House and Senate passed the America Competes Act 
in July 2007 (S. 761 and HR 2272, 110th), and in doing so 
adopted the less detailed ARPA-E language of S. 761. The 
Act was signed into law by President Bush in August 2007. 
Upon signing it, however, President Bush indicated he 
was “disappointed that the legislation includes excessive 
authorizations and expansion of government…including 
a new Department of Energy agency to fund late-stage 
technology development more appropriately left to the 
private sector….” The President also indicated that he “will 
request funding in my 2009 Budget for those authorizations 
that support the focused priorities of the ACI [American 
Competitiveness Initiative], but will not propose excessive 
or duplicative funding based on authorizations in this bill.” 
Presumably this means that the current administration will not 
be seeking appropriations for ARPA-E.
This position had been elaborated in more detail in an April 
26, 2007 letter from the Secretary of Energy and Director of 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy, which stated: 
“At the same time that we support the conceptual goals 
of ARPA-E, we continue to have serious concerns about 
its potential implementation and its impact on ongoing 
DOE basic research efforts. Specifically, the Administration 
is strongly opposed to the creation of new bureaucracy at 
DOE that would drain resources from priority basic research 
efforts.” The letter goes on to express “serious doubts about 
the applicability of the national defense model to the energy 
sector” and a concern that the new agency should “not result 
in the establishment of an additional layer of bureaucracy 
or hinder the ongoing support for advanced research now 
underway in these offices. Similarly, we also urge that this 
legislation not shift DOE’s current balance of efforts along the 
spectrum of research and development.”
In concept, ARPA-E was initially intended to have some of the 
same flexibilities that DARPA has in hiring staff, contracting, 
and managing research. Proponents argued that ARPA-E 
would encourage project managers to pursue risky projects 
with the potential for more revolutionary discoveries by 
providing proper isolation from the pressure to deliver short-
term results along with intense scrutiny of project failures. 
This approach was intended to complement the traditional 
“stovepipe” structure of the DOE program offices, which 
might otherwise limit the pool of resources available for 
non traditional areas of R&D. Proponents also tended to 
argue that the agency would need strong support from the 
Secretary of Energy and President. It remains to be seen, 
however, whether an energy version of DARPA would receive 
the simple oversight and strong backing in Congress that 
DARPA itself has enjoyed for years. Unlike DARPA, which has 
natural and closely linked funder, customer, and end-user in 
the Defense Department, ARPA-E would have no comparable 
“lead purchaser.” Now that it has been established (at least 
on paper), the question remains what such an agency would 
accomplish in practice. Even without a mission that is clearly 
distinct from the broader DOE mission, an ARPA-E with its 
own director, advisory board, and potentially its own budget, 
could potentially serve a distinct purpose within DOE. 
Government and Quasi-Government Corporations
A number of recent proposals have sought, through 
federal legislation, to establish non-profit corporations that 
would focus on low-carbon energy RD&D. In this section 
we briefly describe some of these proposals, which have 
emerged as part of a larger movement over the last several 
decades toward the establishment of government and 
quasi-government organizations that have both public- and 
private-sector characteristics.7 Supporters of these types 
of organizations see them as a way to introduce a more 
entrepreneurial style of management to publicly funded 
7 Kosar, K.R. 2007. The Quasi-Government: Hybrid Organizations with Both Government and Private Sec-
tor Legal Characteristics. cRs Report for congress Rl30533. washington, dc: congressional Research 
service. the report discusses several categories of quasi-governmental entities, including: (1) quasi-official 
agencies, (2) government-sponsored enterprises (Gse), (3) federally funded research and development 
corporations, (4) agency-related nonprofit organizations, (5) venture capital funds, (6) congressionally 
chartered nonprofit organizations, and (7) instrumentalities of indeterminate character.
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RD&D, with an attendant focus on outputs and results 
rather than conformance to process. In such organizations, 
so the argument goes, risk-taking by managers to improve 
performance would be more accepted and encouraged. 
Government-established corporations typically also have 
greater autonomy and flexibility than federal agencies in 
terms of hiring, salaries, and interactions with the private 
sector, and in terms of how they operate under budget and 
regulatory constraints. The ability to act as the recipient 
of a dedicated revenue stream that is outside the normal 
appropriations process is also appealing to some. Greater 
insulation from political influences is frequently mentioned 
among the advantages of quasi-governmental corporations, 
although it is not clear how much difference would exist in 
practice between the pressures experienced by government 
agencies versus quasi-government corporations. 
On the other hand, critics tend to view hybrid public-private 
organizations as weakening the government’s capacity to 
perform its responsibilities and contributing to an erosion 
of the protections afforded by due process, governmental 
checks and balances, and political accountability. They 
view the attraction of quasi-governmental organizations as 
reflecting the natural tendency of organizational leaders—
whether they operate in the public or private sphere—to 
maximize autonomy in policy and operations. In government, 
however, this natural tendency is typically held in check by 
strong counter forces based on laws and accountability 
structures. A challenge therefore arises in harnessing the 
potential power of corporate-based structures to achieve 
efficient outcomes while also satisfying the need for public 
accountability.
Federal charters to establish a corporation typically have 
the following elements: (1) name; (2) purpose; (3) duration 
of existence; (4) governance structure (e.g., executives, 
composition of the board); (5) powers of the corporation; 
and (6) federal oversight powers.8 These elements each have 
detailed sub-elements, a discussion of which is beyond the 
scope of this issue brief. The act that established the Synthetic 
Fuels Corporation, for example, was about 80 pages long, 
not including a lengthy explanatory conference report. 
Other charters are, however, much shorter. Governance 
structures will affect whether a given corporation is subject 
to the Administrative Procedures Act, potential auditing 
by the General Accountability Office, and the Freedom 
of Information Act; they will also affect the degree to 
which a corporation is subject to specific provisions of the 
Government Corporation Control Act regarding budgeting, 
8 see: Kosar, Kevin R. 2005. Congressional or Federal Charters: Overview and Current Issues. cRs Report for 
congress Rs22230. washington, dc: congressional Research service.
financial accounting and auditing, management reporting, 
security holdings, and debt obligations. 
Energy Technology Corporation
An energy technology corporation (ETC) would be a new, 
quasi-governmental corporation intended to provide 
incentives for precommercial research. This idea represents 
the application of a broader concept—the civilian technology 
corporation recommended in a 1992 NAS report—applied 
specifically to the energy sector.9 The ETC would focus on 
developing technologies whose size, scope, or expected 
return falls outside what a private venture capital firm or 
other private-sector entity might fund. Some have suggested 
that an ETC would take certain structural elements of the 
Synthetic Fuel Corporation (SFC), but unlike that entity 
would encourage innovation through financial incentives 
and by “buying information” instead of setting production 
goals.10 Important guiding principles that have been 
mentioned in connection with the ETC concept include 
cost-sharing, industry involvement in project initiation and 
design, insulation from political concerns, diversification 
of investments, openness to foreign firms, and program 
evaluation. 
Specifically, proposals to establish an ETC typically call for 
a single appropriation (to insulate somewhat from political 
pressure) that would ideally be invested so that the returns 
could be used to fund loans, loan guarantees, production 
tax credits, purchase guarantees, and other instruments as 
appropriate. After a few years, the ETC would be subject to 
review and potential dissolution. Guided by an appointed 
board, the ETC would be independent from both the 
executive and legislative branches and hence would in part 
avoid the discontinuity and pressure of constituent-driven 
politics and appropriations. The ETC would also have 
flexibility in choosing investments and could interact with 
university consortia, industry, national labs, and other projects. 
Where cost-sharing is infeasible, the ETC could arrange equity 
venture agreements with small companies. Exemption from 
civil service requirements would allow it to offer compensation 
packages for highly-skilled staff that are competitive with 
the private sector. The modern ETC would also avoid the 
cumbersome procurement regulations that hampered the SFC. 
Among various problems such a corporation would face, the 
ETC would be under pressure to show high rates of return, 
9 national academy of sciences. 1992. The Government Role in Civilian Technology: Building a New Alli-
ance. chapter 3. washington, dc: national academies press. also see deutch, J. 2005. what should the 
Government do to encourage technical change in the energy sector? MIT Joint Program on the Science 
and Policy of Global Change. Report No. 120. cambridge: Mit.
10 see deutch (2005).
129
ASSESSING U.S .  CL IMATE POLICy OPTIONS
even though its portfolio would include high-risk investments 
that otherwise would not be funded given existing market 
incentives. In fact, a high rate of success might indicate 
that the ETC is straying toward technologies that are ready 
for commercialization instead of targeting the earlier, pre-
commercial phases of the innovation process. Defining what 
does or does not constitute “pre-commercial” technology 
research could be controversial, of course; similarly, it could 
be difficult in practice to apply other bounds or guidelines 
to the corporation’s involvement in specific aspects of the 
technology-innovation process.
Synthetic Fuels Corporation
The SFC was established in 1980 as an independent, wholly 
federally-owned corporation to help create a domestic 
synthetic fuel industry as an alternative to importing crude oil. 
Under political pressure to backstop international oil prices, 
the SFC established a production target of 500,000 barrels per 
day. It had a seven-member board of directors, one of whom 
was a full-time chairman, and all of whom were appointed by 
the President and confirmed by the Senate. The SFC had the 
authority to provide financial assistance through purchase 
agreements, price guarantees, loan guarantees, loans, and 
joint ventures for project modules. After predicting oil prices 
of $80–$100 per barrel and a synfuel price of $60 per barrel, 
the SFC was crippled when oil prices plummeted to below 
$20 per barrel. It was eventually canceled in 1986 after several 
billion dollars in expenditures. Many experts have criticized 
the SFC as an example of an inappropriate and failed intrusion 
of government into large-scale commercial demonstration, an 
area better left to the private sphere.11
Climate Change Credit Corporation
The Lieberman-McCain “Climate Stewardship and Innovation 
Act of 2007” (S. 280, 110th) proposes to establish a new 
entity called the Climate Change Credit Corporation (CCCC).  
The CCCC would be a nonprofit corporation; it would not 
issue stock and would not be considered “an agency or 
establishment of the United States Government.” The CCCC 
would have a bi-partisan, five-person board of directors, 
one of whom would be chairman and all of whom would be 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 
With respect to technology, the main purpose of the CCCC 
would be to act as the recipient of emissions allowances,  
which it would sell. The proceeds would then be transferred 
to a new Climate Technology Challenge Program (CTCP) 
within DOE. The CTCP in turn would award funding 
for “development, demonstration, and deployment of 
11 see, for example: cohen, linda R. and Roger G. noll. 1991. the technology pork Barrel. washington, dc: 
Brookings.
technologies that have the greatest potential for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions” using a competitive process. In 
this structure, the flow of money from a non-governmental 
corporation to the DOE could present implementation 
problems. S. 280 would also establish a Climate Technology 
Financing Board within DOE to represent the federal 
government’s interest in joint venture partnerships, loans, and 
loan guarantees with industry. As mentioned above, these 
purposes relate mainly to technology deployment rather than 
to RD&D.
Private Research Consortia
Private industry consortia represent another potential entity 
for administering and/or performing RD&D activities. Joint 
investment and collaboration can help internalize spillover 
benefits and reduce redundant research among firms, 
thereby increasing overall innovation, reducing costs, or 
both. There have been several examples of industry consortia 
since federal antitrust policy toward collaborative R&D 
was revised in the 1980s. In addition to securing funding, 
one of the main challenges for private consortia is finding 
areas for cooperative research that do not run afoul of the 
normal competitive interests of companies. Another issue 
for industry consortia engaged in alternative energy research 
is that a wide variety of fuels, technologies, and approaches 
are likely to be relevant for achieving GHG reductions. At 
a minimum this implies that no single consortium could 
address the full spectrum of energy- and climate-technology 
RD&D opportunities. This section describes several existing 
private-sector consortia that could play an expanded role in 
energy-technology innovation, particularly as coordinators 
and administrators of increased RD&D funding. Outside the 
energy sector, perhaps the best-known private consortium is 
SEMATECH, the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology 
Consortium.
SEMATECH
Until 1996, SEMATECH was funded in equal amounts 
by industry and DARPA (its budget totaled about $200 
million annually). SEMATECH’s 2007 budget is $160 million. 
The original goal of this consortium was to perform pre-
commercial mid-term research in a collaborative setting with 
the ultimate goal of reviving American competitiveness in 
the semiconductor industry. However, much of the research 
was done in highly proprietary areas, such as manufacturing 
processes. Hence, the focus of the consortium shifted toward 
encouraging R&D by firms that develop semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment. This allowed for the industry as a 
whole to benefit somewhat equally from SEMATECH R&D. 
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The consortium has its own central research facility and 
draws upon constituent firms for technical staff. The direct 
employment of assignees eases technology transfer back to 
the member firms.12
Electric Power Research Institute
The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) was established 
as a nonprofit organization in 1973 in response to government 
pressure following a major blackout that struck the Northeast 
region in 1965.13  It was charged with managing a national 
R&D program for the electric power industry. EPRI was initially 
funded by a fee levied on member firms based on their size. 
Member firms that paid fees had access to all R&D results and 
could serve on various committees within the organization. 
EPRI is well established in the electric power industry: its 
members currently generate over 90 percent of U.S. electricity. 
EPRI acts as a funding clearinghouse through which project 
leaders select engineers and scientists to perform R&D. 
Rather than operate a major centralized laboratory, the 
Institute funds external research.
EPRI has been an effective vehicle for wide-ranging 
collaborative research, but deregulation in the 1990s caused 
its revenues to decline to $285 million in 2006 after peaking at 
over $600 million in 1994 (EPRI 2006 Annual Financial Report). 
The organization has adapted by changing its decision-
making and funding structures. In the past, EPRI’s Board of 
Directors and Research Advisory Committee (RAC) reviewed 
projects along with organizational goals and priorities during 
an annual joint meeting. Now that many member companies 
find themselves in direct competition, they have the option  
to buy into various a la carte projects presented by the Board. 
A small portion of the resulting funds is funneled back to 
EPRI’s Office of Innovation to fund long-term, potentially 
revolutionary research. About 25 percent of EPRI funds go 
into deployment projects. Overall, about 90 percent of project 
funds go directly to technology RD&D, while 10 percent of 
funds are spent on economic and industry analyses.
United States Council for Automotive Research
Beginning in the 1980s, U.S. automakers began collaborating 
on technology initiatives. Facing increased competition from 
foreign automakers (and taking advantage of new freedom 
from antitrust laws), Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors 
developed several research consortia. It became clear that 
an umbrella organization was needed to coordinate these 
12 see: Grindley, p., d.c. Mowery, and B. silverman. 1994. seMatecH and collaborative Research: lessons 
in the design of High-technology consortia. Journal of policy analysis and Management 13(4):723-758.
13 see appendix G in national academy of sciences. 1999. Decision Making in the U.S. Department 
of Energy’s Environmental Management Office of Science and Technology. washington, dc: national 
academies press.
efforts and, in 1992, the United States Council for Automotive 
Research (USCAR) was founded for just that purpose. 
Over the past decade, consortia overseen by USCAR have 
addressed diverse automotive technologies, such as new 
batteries and light materials for fuel-efficient vehicles. In 
2003, USCAR joined the U.S. DOE and five major energy 
corporations to form the FreedomCAR & Fuel Partnership, 
which was created to focus on the transition to a hydrogen 
economy. Prior to this, many of the same entities participated 
in the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles, which 
was aimed at building a car that could travel up to 80 miles 
on a gallon of gasoline while offering a competitive level of 
performance, utility, and cost to own. USCAR now oversees 
more than 30 consortia, teams, and working groups. Most of 
these consortia use existing research facilities and research 
funds. Technical experts are generally on loan from the 
participating automakers or from other involved organizations. 
USCAR partners with DOE on many projects and uses DOE’s 
network of national laboratories. One concern that has been 
raised about USCAR, however, is that it gives a limited set of 
companies preferential access to public resources.
Gas Technology Institute
The Gas Technology Institute (GTI), formerly known as the 
Gas Research Institute, is a consortium that involves all 
three segments of the gas industry: production, pipelines, 
and distribution. Though it began as a funding hub for 
outside research, the GTI now maintains 29 research and 
test facilities. Until recently, it was funded by a surcharge 
on natural gas transported through interstate pipelines. In 
1998, a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission settlement 
required the GTI to phase out this surcharge and move to 
voluntary funding by 2004. This development has dramatically 
reduced the organization’s budget: its funding in 2006 totaled 
approximately $50 million, compared to budgets in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s that consistently totaled around 
$200 million. GTI’s longer-term research is now funded by 
royalties from the technologies it develops and by voluntary 
contributions from a subset of “sustaining members”—these 
contributions total about $2 million annually. Sustaining 
members have access to all foundational R&D being done 
within the long-term research program.
Self-Organizing Industry Boards
One proposed variation on traditional research consortia 
(such as EPRI or SEMATECH) is the self-organizing industry 
board (SOIB).14 This approach also has some features in 
common with the “check-off” programs that fund the 
14 Romer, p. and Z. Griliches. 1993. implementing a national technology strategy with self-organizing 
industry Boards. Brookings Papers on Economic Actvity: Microeconomics 2:345-399.
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agricultural commodity boards overseen by the Department 
of Agriculture. Under a SOIB-based research system, an 
industry would lobby the Secretary of Commerce or other 
responsible agency to find that collective action in support of 
RD&D would benefit the public. If the hearing is successful, 
the industry would hold a referendum to levy a tax or fee on 
the product or service it provides.  The fee would be levied 
industry-wide, regardless of how an individual company 
voted. Though collection of this fee would be enforced by the 
government, revenues would not go to the Treasury. Firms 
within each industry would set up a series of boards dedicated 
to R&D; for example, a SOIB might support relevant university 
research or R&D investments by upstream industries. Each 
firm could contribute the fees collected from its customers to 
the board of its choice; if a suitable board did not exist, firms 
could establish one to their liking.
A major advantage of the SOIB approach is that it harnesses 
the public tax system to share the cost of high-spillover R&D 
without being paralyzed by the vagaries of Congressional 
oversight and appropriations. Moreover, it relies on the 
power of competition to direct funds into projects. Instead 
of having to respond to political pressure, firms can funnel 
money to the RD&D areas they feel would be most productive 
for the industry. The ability of new SOIBs to be created and 
compete with existing SOIBs helps ensure against research 
organizations becoming complacent and entrenched.
RD&D Policy Instruments: Contracts 
and Grants, Tax Credits, and Prizes
Alongside a system of patents and intellectual property 
rights, three primary mechanisms exist for encouraging 
R&D: research contracts and grants, research tax credits 
for the private sector, and innovation inducement prizes. In 
addition, important roles exist—within the public and private 
sectors—for coordination, planning, and road mapping 
of R&D activities; international cooperation; and general 
funding for national-level capacity building, including support 
for university-based science and engineering research and 
education infrastructure. 
Contracts and Grants
Contracts and grants issued by DOE and NSF for research 
performed at the national labs or by universities, other 
non-profit institutions, and private firms represent by far the 
most important policy mechanism currently used to deliver 
federal support for energy RD&D. The government also 
funds demonstration projects to test and learn about the 
integration, reliability, and performance of GHG-reducing 
technologies that may not find adequate private funding 
otherwise. Demonstration projects (such as the ongoing 
FutureGen initiative) are typically designed and coordinated 
in partnership with the private sector at a scale that is closer 
to what would be employed in wider commercial deployment. 
The discussion of U.S. DOE programs elsewhere in this issue 
brief provides further elaboration on the level and allocation 
of this type of funding.
Tax Incentives for Private R&D
The Internal Revenue Code provides for two types of R&D tax 
incentives—tax credits and expensing.  Both apply generally, 
though not solely, to energy- or climate-related R&D and both 
give firms incentives to expand research beyond what they 
would otherwise undertake by reducing the after-tax cost of 
R&D investments. Section 41 of the tax code allows firms to 
claim tax credits for extra expenditures on energy research 
and exploration while Section 174 provides for an expensing 
exception, whereby the taxpayer may treat research and 
exploration expenditures as current expenses, rather than 
charging them to a capital account that would be amortized 
only over a longer period of time.
The tax credit provided under Section 41 amounts to 20 
percent of qualified research expenditures beyond a firm’s 
baseline level (based on historical research expenditures or 
an alternative method). Qualified expenses include in-house 
salaries and supplies, certain time-sharing costs for computer 
use, and contract research performed by certain non-profit 
research organizations; moreover, these expenses must be 
incurred in the process of discovering new information that 
the taxpayer could use to develop new products or processes. 
A 20-percent credit with a separate threshold for payments is 
available for funds provided to universities for basic research; 
similarly, payments to certain energy research consortia (such 
as EPRI) are eligible for a 20-percent credit with no threshold. 
The U.S. Treasury estimates that the cost of these tax 
incentives has averaged about $5 billion each in recent 
years. Overall, econometric studies have found that they are 
effective in the sense that private sector research spending 
has increased roughly one-for-one with each dollar of tax 
credit extended. R&D tax credits have the advantage of 
encouraging private efforts to advance technology while 
leaving specific R&D decisions and judgments about the 
most productive areas for investment, given both economic 
and regulatory incentives, to industry. As a result, there is less 
need for policy intervention in the market and for government 
to “pick winners.” Tax credits have other advantages over 
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alternative R&D funding mechanisms: they create less of an 
administrative burden, obviate the need to target individual 
firms for assistance, and can be made permanent (and 
therefore not subject to annual appropriations).
Nonetheless, several factors have limited the overall impact of 
the research and exploration tax credit such that it represents 
only a small fraction of total federal and private-sector R&D 
expenditures. First, the credit was originally added to the tax 
code as a temporary measure—consequently, it has had to be 
renewed more than ten times, often with modifications. This 
uncertainty makes long-range research planning based on tax 
considerations difficult and has led many to call for making the 
research and exploration credit permanent. It has also proved 
difficult in practice to distinguish expenses that qualify for the 
credit from other expenses; moreover, under current rules, 
eligible expenditures are quite restricted. Even if research is 
considered qualified, related expenses such as overhead and 
equipment costs are not covered (although certain equipment 
costs are eligible for accelerated depreciation). Expenses for 
basic research conducted in-house and research conducted 
overseas are excluded altogether.  Finally, tax credits are 
ineffective in situations where a firm has little taxable income. 
Thus the strength of the incentive they provide will vary with 
the business cycle. 
Distributional considerations may also enter. One disadvantage 
of tax credits is that firms can claim them for research they 
would have undertaken even without additional incentives 
—in that case firms are rewarded at taxpayer expense without 
providing commensurate public benefit. To address this 
concern, tax credits are typically offered only for expenses 
above a defined baseline level, but in practice the true 
baseline level is impossible to determine. In addition, the 
fact that the vast share of credits tends to be claimed by 
large firms may raise equity concerns, although this result is 
somewhat to be expected given that large firms conduct most 
of the research.
In the context of climate policy, the main shortcoming of a 
tax credit approach is the difficulty of targeting R&D efforts 
that are particularly relevant to GHG mitigation. A recent 
modification of the existing credit to include contributions to 
energy research consortia addresses this issue to some extent. 
In addition, some groups (such as the National Commission 
on Energy Policy) have recommended that tax credits be 
increased for technologies aimed at improving end-use 
efficiency or otherwise reducing GHG emissions. It may be 
difficult, however, for Congress and the Treasury to develop 
workable qualification rules for an augmented R&D tax credit 
that would focus specifically on efforts relevant for GHG 
mitigation while excluding other types of R&D. This approach 
is also vulnerable to a broader concern that attempts to 
achieve particular policy goals by fine-tuning the tax code can 
create significant windfall opportunities for interest groups, 
distort market incentives, and result in bad tax policy.
Innovation Inducement Prizes
Recently, attention has turned to innovation-inducement 
prizes or awards as another possible mechanism for delivering 
R&D incentives. The idea would be to offer financial or other 
rewards for achieving specific technology objectives that 
have been specified in advance (in contrast to ex-post awards 
like the Nobel Prize).15 Inducement prizes have historically 
played a role in advancing technology in areas ranging from 
maritime navigation and canning to mathematics, commercial 
aviation, and automotive engineering. Recent examples 
relevant to energy and climate policy include the Hydrogen 
Prize Act (which passed the House in the 109th Congress), a 
number of energy prizes authorized in the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 (these have yet to be funded, however), Congressional 
interest in prizes to be administered by the NSF, the privately-
funded Automotive X-Prize, and the Earth Challenge Prize 
announced by British financier Richard Branson. The prize 
approach has also been explicitly endorsed in some proposals 
as an instrument to be used by ARPA-E.
Inducement prizes are clearly not suited to all research 
objectives, but they have the potential to play a larger role 
along with research contracts, grants, and R&D tax credits. In 
contrast to these other instruments, prizes have the attractive 
incentive property of targeting and rewarding innovation 
outputs, rather than inputs: the prize is paid only if the 
objective is attained. Prizes or awards can help to focus efforts 
on specific high-priority objectives, without specifying how the 
goal is to be accomplished; potentially, they can also attract 
a more diverse range of innovators. A National Academy 
Committee recently endorsed the idea of establishing a 
program of innovation inducement prizes at NSF. This effort 
would be launched as an experimental program in close 
consultation with the academic and non-profit community, 
technical societies, and industry.16
15 newell, R.G. and n. wilson. 2005. technology prizes for climate Mitigation. RFF discussion paper 05-33. 
washington, dc: RFF.
16 national Research council. 2007. Innovation Inducement Prizes at the National Science Foundation. 
washington, dc: national academies press.
